You have to love a study run by a vendor where the results clearly demonstrate a problem that very vendor solves. What a pleasant surprise!

Sarcasm aside, Damballa concluded that anti-virus misses a whole bunch of malware. We've seen this conclusion before. Their opinion is that they can protect you from your own compromised machines with their product.

When I read about these sorts of reactive technologies, I have a mixed response. Responding to the fire *is* important, but preventing the fire is always more important. I'm surprised that the industry continues to come up with new reactive technologies.

Did you donate to Norm Coleman? Well, your credit card and donor information has been floating around the dark side of the internet. Wikileaks has published evidence of the data breach. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune has a piece on how Coleman may have violated the law by not notifying donors who were compromised.

But this article misses an important point, or rather only touches on it in a single paragraph. Seth Peter, CTO at NetSPI, points out that "[t]he same rigor that a financial institution or big box retailer puts into their credit card collection needs to be replicated on a smaller scale."

How should/does PCI handle 'retailers' who aren't permanent? We don't know for sure how the Coleman campaign processed transactions, but we do know that they were storing card data that PCI requires you not store (security codes). It's not just PCI that makes this requirement, however, but Minnesota state law (H.F. 1758).

In other words, the Coleman campaign possibly violated the law by not notifying donors of compromised data, may be in violation of PCI (with fines?) by storing the data insecurely, and likely violated the law by storing the data for more than 48 hours after the transaction.

That being said, and left to law enforcement, we're left with a question of how PCI deals with transient retailers. The Coleman campaign (though existing longer than most) isn't a permanent retailer, so the PCI lifecycle can't really apply. What does it mean to get an annual audit if you don't exist for the whole year? What would the 2009 QSA audit for Coleman's campaign look like if it's conducted in December? What about ASV scans?

Yet, at the same time that risk might be reduced by the limited duration of the 'retailer,' entities like political campaigns present a higher risk of compromise. Here are a few things that PCI could do to deal with these situations:

1. Define a merchant tier for ephemeral entities

2. Require that they get audited by a QSA prior to starting processing or that they *completely* outsource the processing operations.

3. Require that they get an ASV scan prior to and during their operating period.

These three things can bring them into compliance and reduce risk using existing PCI mechanisms on a tighter time scale.