There are two words that I fear more than any other, and I imagine the same is true for most other vendors. Those magical two words that send shivers down spines of support and make grown engineers cry... 'Application Interaction'. The term, used to describe a potential negative impact that one product may inadvertently have on another, is often seen as a "Red Alert, Battlestations" type of scenario. You see, when you develop a product that's designed to identify vulnerabilities, you become more familiar with this term than most other software vendors. The problem is that 99% of the time, the issue isn't yours to fix and "Application Interaction" becomes a thinly veiled way of saying "Vulnerability Discovery". Even though we know what's going on, the nature of the term and the thoughts associated with it lead to vendors squirrelling the term away and the real problem is never discussed.
So why do I consider "Application Interaction" to really mean "Vulnerability Discovery", especially in the context of vulnerability management? Imagine an attacker sending packets to remote systems and causing those remote systems to hang or crash. That would be defined as a Denial of Service and, since we're talking about a remote service, even Microsoft would issue a patch and call it a vulnerability. The problem is that small and/or specialty vendors (like SCADA solution providers) don't always see it that way, their programs start to crash and they tell the customer that the "scanner" is the issue. However, as you can see, scanner and attacker could be used interchangeably in the sentence above. Of course, everyone aims to be non-invasive and no one purposely releases code that will crash a service, but it happens; it's a fact of life that we need to live with. The question is how do we deal with this and the answer should be urging the software developer to issue a patch.
Let's consider the most popular example, printer crashes. The TCP/IP stack in most printers is notoriously fragile, googling for 'port scan printer crash' will demonstrate this, and everyone in the industry is aware of it. Yet printer vendors will point you toward the other vendor involved because nobody wants to rewrite code.
A recent example that I encountered involved some fairly important software for a very important company. The software would crash when scanned; yet when you connected to the software via telnet or netcat, it was fine. We did some fairly extensive testing and discovered something interesting: the software -- remember how important it is -- would only crash if the source port was greater than 32767. Now, when you are using your computer and connect to another device, the ephemeral port is often below 32767. This was the case, however when you're connecting to thousands of ports across potentially thousands of hosts, it's quite easy for your source port to be higher than 32767. This is exactly what was happening, connect with a source port of 32768 or greater, and the service would crash. We'd done everything we could as a company to be non-invasive, yet a programming flaw in the other application lead to an integer being signed instead of unsigned, limiting the port range from a max of 65535 to 32767. We were able to work with the vendor in this case, and they fixed the flaw and released an update. When considering this scenario, keep in mind how important this software was... we cannot forget how dangerous a denial of service in critical software is.
So the next time you encounter an "Application Interaction", work with your vendors and help your vendors work together, the odds are the product that's causing the interaction has found a 0-day in the other application and, ultimately, that's a good thing. The flaw is identified internally, rather than being exploited by a malicious attacker. A fix can be developed, and quickly tested with the two vendors working together. The most important thing to keep in mind is that your security solution, the product that you pay for to keep you secure, is doing it's job and, at that point, possibly exceeding your expectations. You may even end up with a CVE credited to you, and there's nothing wrong with that.